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two sentence opinion ordering that the current stay of execution entered
by the United States Court of Appeals in that case be vacated. The final
sentence of the decision simply states that, "[n]o further stays of Robert
Alton Harris' execution shall be entered by the federal courts except upon
order of this Court." 14 This decision, again, reflects the growing
impatience of the Court. It is becoming more and more apparent that the
United States Supreme Court is no longer going to tolerate extensive and
lengthy appeals in capital cases.
Although these opinions are directed more toward the courts than
attorneys, it is important to bear in mind the increasing lack of patience
that the current Supreme Court is exhibiting. 15 The new "tone" of the
Supreme Court regarding the granting of stays has the potential to
14 Id. The stay being vacated was the last in a series of stays given
by the Ninth Circuit during the night leading up to Harris' execution the
next morning.
15 The United States Court of Appeals for Fourth Circuit has
drastically increase the execution rate in Virginia. Attorneys must not
depend on last-minute stays of execution nor count on cases drifting
through the circuit courts for extended periods of time. Instead, attorneys
must aggressively pursue all potential claims at every step of the process
and ensure that they are fully presented. There will be few, if any, second
chances.
Summary and analysis by:
Lesley Meredith James
demonstrated similar impatience in the area of administrative delays.
See Spann v. Martin, 963 F.2d 663 (1992). See case summary of Spann,
Capital Defense Digest, this issue.
WILLIAMS v. DIXON
961 F.2d 448 (4th Cir. 1992)
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
FACTS
Douglas Williams, Jr. was arrested on August 2, 1981 and charged
with the murder of one-hundred year old Adah Hemdon Dawson. Under
the influence of drugs and alcohol, Williams had entered the Dawson
home looking for a place to sleep. When Dawson surprised him in the
kitchen, Williams struck her with a stick he had picked up on the porch.
He laid her on the floor and proceeded to ransack the house. He then
returned to the kitchen and forced a mop handle into Dawson's vagina.
During the guilt phase of the trial, the medical examiner testified
that Dawson suffered numerous lacerations to her head, neck, arms,
vagina and rectum, together with fractures of the face, skull, pubic bone
and hip bone. The medical examiner further testified that Dawson died
as a result of the multiple injuries.
Williams offered no evidence at the guilt phase of trial. The jury
found him guilty under North Carolina law of first degree murder in the
perpetration of first degree burglary, in the perpetration of a sex offense,
and with malice, premeditation and deliberation.
At the sentencing phase, the state relied upon the evidence pre-
sented at the guilt phase, as well as a written psychological report finding
that Williams did not suffer any mental defect or disorder which would
have prevented him from distinguishing right from wrong at the time of
thekilling. Thereport furtherconcluded thatintoxication would not have
relieved Williams of responsibility for the crime. Williams introduced
evidence of his past criminal record, as well as evidence that he was
mildly retarded, with poor reading skills and possible organic brain
impairment.
Based upon the evidence presented during the sentencing phase, the
jury was presented with four possible aggravating factors and five
I State v. Williams, 301 S.E.2d 335, 338 (1983).
2 Williams v. North Carolina, 464 U.S. 865 (1983), reh'g denied,
464 U.S. 1004 (1983).
3 Williams also argued that (1) the constitution prohibits the
imposition of the death penalty upon a mildly retarded defendant; (2) he
received ineffective assistance of counsel; and (3) the evidence was
insufficient to support the verdict. These issues will not be addressed in
this summary.
possible mitigating factors. The jury was instructed that it could consider
the mitigating factors only if they unanimously agreed to do so. After
the sentencing phase, the jury returned a recommendation for a sentence
of death, and the judge sentenced Williams to death.
The North Carolina Supreme Court upheld Williams' conviction on
appeal.1 The United States Supreme Court denied both certiorari and a
request for rehearing. 2 In May 1984, Williams filed a state habeas
petition. The state court denied the request in June, 1985, and the North
Carolina Supreme Court denied review. On October 13, 1987, Williams
filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina. The judge denied the
petition without a hearing.
Williams appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals arguing,
among other issues, that the sentencing instruction requiring unanimity
for considering mitigating factors was unconstitutional.
3
HOLDING
The Fourth Circuit affirmed Williams' conviction for first degree
murder.4 However, relying upon the United States Supreme Court's
ruling in McKoy v. North Carolina,5 the court found that "the unanimity
requirement [regarding mitigating circumstances] given to the jury at
Williams' sentencing proceedings... was unconstitutional. '6 Because
the court further found that Williams' claim was not barred by the
Supreme Court's general ban on retroactive application of new rules to
habeas corpus claims in Teague v. Lane7, the court vacated Williams'
sentence and remanded the case to the district court.8
The Fourth Circuit also established a second, independent reason
for vacating Williams' death sentence. Concluding that "Teague's
4 Williams v. Dixon, 961 F.2d 448 (4th Cir. 1992).
5 494 U.S. 433 (1990). In McKoy, the court struck down a jury
instruction requiring unanimity for considering mitigating circumstances
during penalty phase deliberations as unconstitutional.
Williams, 961 F.2d at 452.
7 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
8 Williams, 961 F.2d at 450.
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retroactivity analysis is not jurisdictional in nature and is an affirmative
defense that must be asserted below or else be waived," 9 the court ruled
that the State of North Carolina had waived its right to raise a retroactivity
defense by failing to assert it at the district court level or at the first
hearing before the court of appeals. 10
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
I. The McKoy rule is entitled to retroactive application
as an exception to Teague.
In McKoy, the Supreme Court struck down the North Carolina
requirement that a jury unanimously agree upon the existence of a
mitigating factor before it may be considered in sentencing. 11 The jury
in Williams was instructed on the same unanimity requirement found to
be unconstitutional in McKoy. 12 Because Williams' conviction became
final in 1983,13 prior to the decision in McKoy,the Fourth Circuit had to
determine whetherWilliams was entitled to retroactive application of the
McKoy rule.
14
In Teague v. Lane,15 the Supreme Court established the general rule
that "'new rules' . . . should not be applied retroactively to cases on
collateral review." A case is deemed to announce a new rule "if the result
was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's
conviction became final."
16
The Teague court also established two exceptions to the rule. The
first is that"a new rule should be applied retroactively if it places 'certain
kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the
criminal law-making authority to pro-scribe.' 17 The second exception
is that a new rule should be applied retroactively if it would "'alter our
understanding of the bedrock procedural elements that must be found
to vitiate the fairness of a particular conviction' 18 and "without which
the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished." 19
Penry v. Lynaugh20 applied the Teague rule to capital cases.
Because the Fourth Circuit found that Teague's second exception
applied to Williams,21 it declined to address whether McKoy established
a"new rule".22 In applying the second Teague exception in Williams, the
Fourth Circuit first looked at the McKoy rule to determine if it improved
the accuracy of capital sentencing. Citing the Supreme Court's decision
9 Id. at 456.
10 Id. at 459.
11 494 U.S. 433. Under current Virginia law, defense counsel will
not be faced with a McKoy problem because there is no requirement of
unanimity for considering a mitigating factor.
12 Williams, 961 F.2d at 452,456.
13 A conviction is final when: (1) judgment has been rendered; (2)
available direct appeals have been exhausted; and (3) time for petition for
certiorari has expired. Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255, 258, n.1 (1986).
In Williams' case, certiorari was denied in 1983. State v. Williams, 301
S.E.2d 335, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 865, reh'g denied, 464 U.S. 1004
(1983).
14 After McKoy, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that the
decision did not completely invalidate the state's death penalty statute.
See State v. McKoy, 394 S.E.2d 426 (N.C. 1990). Therefore, Williams'
sentence was not automatically reduced to life imprisonment. Williams,
961 F.2d at 452.
15 489 U.S. 288, 305, 310.
16 Id. at 301.
17 Id. at 307.
18 Id. at 311 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 693-
694 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)) (emphasis
added).
19 Id. at 313.
20 492 U.S. 302 (1989). See case summary of Penry, Capital
in Sawyer v. Smith,23 the court found that the McKoy rule easily met that
requirement: "'All of our Eighth Amendmentjurisprudence concerning
capital sentencing is directed toward the enhancement of reliability and
accuracy in some sense.'
24
The Fourth Circuit also found that the McKoy rule "alter[ed] our
understanding of the bedrock procedural elements that must be found to
vitiate the fairness of a particular conviction.' 25 Relying upon the
Supreme Court's emphasis in Woodson v. North Carolina26 and Sumner
v. Shuman27 on the need for reliable individualized sentencing in the
capital context, the Fourth Circuit concluded "that a rule striking down
a unanimity requirement for mitigating circumstances is 'implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty.'
28
The Fourth Circuit also relied upon Mills v. Maryland29 in finding
arbitrary any sentencing scheme which requires unanimity to consider
mitigating evidence because such a scheme allows a solejuror to prevent
consideration of such evidence.30 Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion
in McKoy also pronounced such a sentencing scheme "arbitrary."
31
Consequently, the Williams court found that the sentencing scheme
struck down in McKoy had been arbitrary and capricious.
Based upon its review of the above cases, the Fourth Circuit found
thatthe rule inMcKoy was a"bedrockprocedural element" and that it was
"implicit in ordered liberty." 32 The court, therefore, held that the McKoy
rule fell within the second Teague exception and "should be applied
retroactively. ' 3
3
II. Teague claims are subject to procedural default by the state.
The Fourth Circuit added another reason for vacating Williams'
death sentence. Noting the importance of the chronology of decisions
affecting Williams' federal habeas petition, the court found that the State
of North Carolina had failed to raise the retroactivity defense against his
unanimity claim until after the Supreme Court's decision in McKoy.
34
Williams, on the other hand, had raised the claim from the beginning
based on the Supreme Court's earlier holding in Mills v. Maryland.
Indeed, the State did not raise the retroactivity issue until well after the
first oral argument before the court of appeals.
After reviewing conflicting decisions of several other circuits, the
Fourth Circuit held that"the Teague rule is notjurisdictional, in the sense
Defense Digest, Vol. 2, No. 1, p. 2 (1989).
21 The first exception does not apply because the proscribed
conduct is capital murder and McKoy does not prohibit its prosecution.
Williams, 961 F.2d at 453-454.
22 Id. at 453. In an earlier case, however, a Fourth Circuit panel
indicated that McKoy was a "new law" decision. See McDougall v.
Dixon, 921 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1990).
23 497 U.S. 227 (1990) (holding that in order to apply retroactively
under a Teague exception, a new rule must do more than simply improve
the accuracy of the trial process). See case summary of Sawyer, Capital
Defense Digest, Vol. 3, No. 1, p. 4 (1990).
24 Williams, 961 F.2d at 454 (qutoing Sawyer, 110 S.Ct. at 2831).
25 Id. at 455 (citing Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 693
(1971)).
26 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
27 483 U.S. 66 (1987).
28 Williams, 961 F.2d at 455 (citations omitted).
29 486 U.S. 367 (1988). See case summary of Mills, Capital
Defense Digest, Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 11 (1988).
30 William, 961 F.2d at 456 (citing Mills at 374).
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that a court must address it sua sponte if not raised."'35 The court then
addressed whether the State's failure to raise the defense at the district
court level amounted to a waiver.
First, the court considered the general rule that "claims not adjudi-
cated below, and in particular defenses that have not been raised in a
pleading, by motion, or at trial, normally will be considered waived and
cannot be heard for the first time on appeal."'36 In habeas proceedings,
the court found that waiver usually takes the form of procedural default,
resulting in a bar to a claim not presented to the state court "unless the
petitioner can show cause for the default and actual prejudice. 37 The
court concluded that such procedural default applies equally to the
defendant and to the State. Therefore, if a claim or defense is not raised
in the court below, it will be barred on appeal.
38
In Williams, because the State failed to raise a retroactivity defense
at the district court level, or at the first argument before the court of
appeals, it was deemed to have waived its Teague defense to the
application of the MillslMcKoy rule.
Ill. Application in Virginia.
Defense counsel should be fully aware of the implications of the
Teague rule. Timing on appeal, as well as preserving all appealable
issues throughout the pre-trial, trial and post-trial processes, becomes
increasingly important in obtaining all potential constitutional benefits
for a capital defendant. Opinions such as Williams make it clear that
defense counsel need to remain aware and informed as to potential or
pending issues before the courts of appeal and/or Supreme Court.
Because a defendant's conviction does not become final for Teague
purposes until the end of the direct appeals process, the longer one takes
in thatprocess, thebetterone's chances forbenefitting from a "new rule."
35 Id. at 458. See also Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 (1990)
(declaring Teague rule "is not 'jurisdictional"').
36 Id. (citing Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Internal Revenue
Service, 765 F.2d 1174, 1176, n.1 (D.C.Cir. 1985)).
Unfortunately, timing may be all that separates one defendant from
another in benefitting from the recognition of new constitutional inter-
pretations or applications.
When the Supreme Court announced the Teague retroactivity rule,
the Court appeared to signal an end to the potential benefits of new rules
for defendants on collateral appeal. Very few defendants were expected
to find themselves the beneficiaries of one of Teague's narrow excep-
tions. The Fourth Circuit's holding in Williams, however, provides
encouragement for future findings of exceptions to the Teague rule. Of
particular benefit to Virginia defendants is the Fourth Circuit's apparent
willingness to ferret out abasis for finding aTeague exception. If defense
counsel has diligently preserved and presented all potential constitu-
tional claims throughout the appeals process, a defendant may still reap
the benefits of future Supreme Court decisions.
The most important practical aspect of Williams to Virginia practi-
tioners may be the Fourth Circuit's recognition that procedural default
can work against the state. While taking care to preserve and protect the
defendant's claims for relief on appeal, defense counsel should also be
aware of the Commonwealth's failure to raise defenses during the
appeals process. Certainly, defense counsel should take care not to alert
the Commonwealth to any omissions at early stages of the appeals
process, particularly involving a Teague defense of retroactivity. If the
Fourth Circuit consistently applies its ruling in Williams, defendants may
profit from new rules simply by the failure of the Commonwealth to raise
the retroactivity defense, thus broadening the scope of potential benefits
in spite of Teague.
Summary and analysis by:
Susan F. Henderson
37 Id. (citing Bassette v. Thompson, 915 F.2d 932, 937 (4th Cir.
1990)). See case summary of Bassette, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 3,
No. 2,. 8 (1991).38 Id. at 459.
ADAMS v. AIKEN
965 F.2d 1306 (1992)
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
FACTS
After his first conviction and sentence of death was reversed,
Sylvester Lewis Adams was retried and then convicted of kidnapping,
murder and housebreaking and given a death sentence. Subsequently,
the state circuit court denied Adams' request for postconviction relief,
and both the South Carolina and United States Supreme Court denied
certiorari. 1 The United States magistrate recommended denial of the
federal writ of habeas corpus that Adams then filed, which had alleged
numerous errors at the trial court level. The United States District Court
for the District of South Carolina accepted the magistrate's recommen-
dation and denied Adams' petition.
On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, Adams raised a number of errors at
1 Adams v. Aiken, 476 U.S. 1109 (1986).
2 Adams raised several errors that will not be discussed in this case
summary, including claims that (I) Adams' conviction violated due
process due to his mental incompetence during portions of the trial, (2)
his death sentence violated the Eighth Amendment, as the jury failed to
various stages of the trial. 2 At voir dire, Adams claimed error because
one of the prospective jurors stated that he would accept the testimony of
a police officer over the testimony of a private citizen. In response, the
trial judge inquired whether the prospective juror could make a decision
based on the evidence presented and on the instructions given him by the
court. When the prospective juror answered in the affirmative, the trial
judge qualified him over Adams' objection. At the time, Adams had two
peremptory strikes remaining.
At the guilt stage, the trial judge, in his instructions to the jury,
defined reasonable doubt as "synonymous" with "proof to a moral
certainty" and a "substantial doubt, a doubt for which you can give a
reason." Adams argued that the instruction violated his due process
rights.
find the murder occurred during the commission of the kidnapping and
housebreaking, (3) the trial judge's failure to limit definition of aggravat-
ing factors in his instructions to the jury violated Adams' Eighth
Amendment rights.
